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THE FISCAL POWERS AND THE 1930s: ENTRENCHMENT
JOHN HARRISON*
Most constitutional theory is normative and looks to the past.
Theorists usually adopt the viewpoint of a contemporary actor,
typically a judge on a court with final decisional authority, and
ask about the relevance of past events to the judge's decision.1
For example, in one standard form of the argument over
originalism, the question is whether the judge today should treat
as conclusive an application of the constitutional text that gener-
ally was accepted at the time of adoption.2 Deeper questions
arise when one looks beyond the context of judicial decision,
abandons the standard suppositions concerning judicial author-
ity, and asks why people today should care about events that
took place long before any of us were born.
Although expressions of opinion on the foregoing issues are in
no danger of running out, there is a surprising shortage of
thinking about how constitutions work, rather than how they
ought to work. Theory that discusses what makes some constitu-
tional arrangements effective and others ineffective is relatively
scarce. This Essay uses as its test instrument a forward-looking
perspective that considers not how we are bound by the past,
but rather how we may bind the future. An attempt to answer
that question should provide some insight into the actual opera-
tions of constitutions in general and the American constitutional
system in particular. In order not to stray too far from the topic
of this symposium, I will bring this perspective to bear on the
most important change in the practice of American government
* Professor of Law and Class of 1966 Research Professor, University of Virginia.
Thanks are due to the other participants in and organizers of the conference at
which this paper was presented.
1. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 398-99 (1995).
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that took place during the 1930s: the dramatic expansion of
federal spending. That thunder still reverberates through our
constitutional politics.
3
To some extent, any change in legal rules binds the future in
any system where the rules are followed as such and formally
changing them is costly. Constitutional rules are often said to be
entrenched, however, in the sense that it is more difficult to
change them than to alter ordinary laws, because the process of
constitutional amendment is more difficult than the process of
statutory change.4 The options available to would-be constitu-
tion-makers thus depend on the available mechanisms of en-
trenchment.
One aspect of this question occupies much of Bruce
Ackerman's second volume of We the People.' Ackerman provides
a detailed account of the Roosevelt Administration's decision to
support the Court-packing plan rather than an Article V amend-
ment, and discusses the eventual use of transformative Supreme
Court appointments instead of an amendment.6 Ackerman is
much concerned with the fact that although both court-packing
and nonpacking transformative appointments are instruments of
constitutional change, it is not so clear that they are instru-
ments of constitutional entrenchment.7 For example, suppose
that Reagan and Bush had created a majority of Justices who
believed that Wickard v. Filburn' and United States v. Darby9
and maybe even NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."0 were
decided wrongly under the Constitution as it stood in 1933.
Would this majority have been required to overrule those cases
on the grounds that no subsequent amendment vindicated ex-
panded federal regulatory power? Ackerman says no because he
believes that something more than a shift in judicial personnel
3. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 5, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing a constitutional amend-
ment requiring a balanced budget without "the use of Social Security surpluses to
achieve compliance").
4. See Larry Alexander, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 2 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
5. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 268-344 (1998).
6. See id. at 316-33, 351-53.
7. See id. at 403-09.
8. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
9. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
10. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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took place under Roosevelt, but he confesses that the case is
harder to make than it would be had the more familiar tech-
nique of Article V entrenchment been employed.11
Although Ackerman is worried about the entrenching effects
of the constitutional changes that took place during the Roose-
velt Administration, especially as compared to the effects of
changes that were considered but not adopted, the New Dealers
do not seem to have been so concerned.' 2 Their immediate prob-
lem involved freeing themselves from the chains of the past, and
they seem to have given little thought to imposing chains on the
future.1" Maybe they would have been against doing so, believing
with Thomas Jefferson that the earth belongs to the living and
that each generation should be. able to make its own destiny.'4
Maybe they would have thought entrenchment unnecessary
because the country had finally emerged into modernity and no
one would ever want to turn back.
On the other hand, if the New Dealers had thought about it,
maybe they would have wanted to protect against the possibility
of another Justice McReynolds, who, after all, was appointed by
a liberal President, just as Justice Brennan was appointed by a
conservative. In seeking entrenchment, the Democrats would
have been following the Reconstruction Republicans, a group
who clearly regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as a guard
against future backsliding. Section 1 was designed not only to
underwrite the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but also to prevent its
repeal by a future Democratic Congress.15 More to the point,
Section 2 was designed to prevent the election of such a Con-
gress.'6
11. See 2 ACKMRMAN, supra note 5, at 314-17, 362-66.
12. See id. at 403-09.
13. See id. at 347-48.
14. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOhIAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) ("I set out
on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, 'that the earth belongs in usu-
fruct to the living': that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.").
15. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 958 (1995) (stating that "Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ... was to provide a firm constitutional basis for the 1866 Act and to ensure
that future Congresses would not be able to repeal it").
16. See EARL M. MALTZ, CVM RIGHTS, THE CONSTrrUmON, AND CONGRESS, 1863-
1869, at 49-50 (1990).
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As the observation about Reconstruction suggests, entrench-
ment in order to preserve current political advantage is only one
reason for adopting a higher-order legal rule, and perhaps not
the most desirable. Entrenching maneuvers are doubtful as a
matter of political morality because they represent attempts by
people in the present to control people in the future. Somewhat
less troublesome are entrenchments that attempt to make bind-
ing deals that secure political agreement. The classic American
example of that kind of constitutional rule is equal state suf-
frage in the Senate, the "great compromise" that was thought
necessary to secure participation by the smaller states in the
new Union.17 That deal is placed into the deepest trench the
Constitution has, a limitation on the amendment power itself.
Least troublesome of all, but still problematic, is the use of con-
stitutional rules as self-binding mechanisms through which
people in their lucid moments seek to limit their options at
times of greater stress.18
For present purposes, however, this Essay assumes that the
Roosevelt Administration would have sought to change constitu-
tional norms in order both to fill in the old trench and dig a new
one. Though the Roosevelt Administration was mainly concerned
with the problem of federal regulatory power, I will take the
federal government's spending power as my basis for specula-
tion; the spending power is at least as much the foundation of
the modem state as the federal government's regulatory power. 9
Certainly the availability of that power was a main plank of the
New Deal because it underlay federal unemployment compen-
sation and old-age pensions.20
17. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 57, 69-70 (1996).
18. For a discussion on constitutional self-binding, see Jon Elster, Intertemporal
Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35, 35-45 (George Loewenstein
& Jon Elster eds., 1992).
19. For example, nondefense federal outlays were 8.1% of the gross domestic prod-
uct in 1940 and 16.5% in 1998. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECU-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 103, 109 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937). The New Deal and what has come after also rests on the fed-
eral government's other fiscal power, the power of laxation. That question was large-
ly settled, however, by the Sixteenth Amendment, proposed during the presidency of
that notable constitutional revolutionary, William Howard Taft.
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Suppose, then, that President Roosevelt and his coadjutors
had wanted to establish firmly the principle on which Congress
acted when it passed the Social Security Act21 and which the
Supreme Court endorsed in dictum in United States v. Butler:22
that Congress may spend tax revenue so as to advance the na-
tional interest in general.23 How might they have gone about
doing that?
The most direct approach would be an Article V amendment.
That is a little trickier than it first appears. To begin with, an
amendment will become part of the entire Constitution. A new
power will be slotted into the already existing structure of gov-
ernment and will interact with provisions that limit powers by
overriding the results that otherwise would flow from the grant
of power.
The interaction between powers and affirmative limitations on
powers creates two questions. First, the drafters of a power-
granting amendment must decide to what extent they want to
free the new power from existing limitations. In the easiest case
the answer is not at all, which is to say that the only limitation
being undone is one that results from the principle of enumera-
tion itself. Even accomplishing this can be difficult because the
general principle is that when two legal enactments are equally
authoritative, last in time prevails. Any time a power is added to
the Constitution it is possible to argue that it is free from preex-
isting affirmative limitations.
This possibility arises largely because the First Congress
rejected Madison's proposal concerning the drafting of constitu-
tional amendments.' Madison recommended that amendments
alter the text, as Congress does when it amends its statutes."
Had that approach been adopted, a new power that was to be
subject to all previous limitations would simply be added to the
appropriate list of powers, usually Article I, Section 8. Converse-
ly, if a preexisting power was to be freed of a limitation that
applied specifically to that power, that limitation could simply
21. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
22. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
23. See id. at 65.
24. See Edward Hartnett, A 'Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or, What if Madi-
son Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMNENARY 251, 252-53 (1998).
25. See id.
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be removed. Also, a new power that was to override all preexist-
ing limitations, if one wanted such a thing, would be reflected by
a clause making explicit that the new pover was not subject to
any of the Constitution's restrictions on legislative authority.
The First Congress rejected Madison's suggestion.26 As a re-
sult, this difficulty has been with us ever since. The standard
approach seems to be simply to ignore Madison's failure, leaving
it implicit that, for example, Congress may not enforce Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment with bills of attainder. Although
such a limitation on Congress may seem obvious, problems can
arise in this context. The Sixteenth Amendment, for example,
states that Congress may tax incomes "from whatever source de-
rived.., without regard to any census or enumeration."27 The
Sixteenth Amendment plainly exempts direct taxes from the
apportionment requirement, but it is unclear whether the above
phrase lifts other restrictions. When the amendment was pro-
posed, Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York, feared
that it did affect other limitations and recommended that the
New York legislature reject the amendment because it would
empower Congress to tax income from state and municipal
bonds. 8
A drafter who wanted belts and suspenders for the affirmative
limitations could draft so as to address this problem when giving
a new power. For example, Madison's approach could be approxi-
mated by referring to a particular clause. One could write: The
power conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8, paragraph 1
of this Constitution shall include the power to spend the funds
raised by taxation to provide for the common defense and pro-
mote the general welfare. The Eleventh Amendment, which
refers to the judicial power of the United States, works some-
what like this.
29
This assumes that the New Dealers simply would have want-
ed to add to the list of powers, leaving the affirmative restric-
26. See id. at 258.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
28. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50
(1999).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In Eleventh Amendment fashion, drafters wanting
to ensure the validity of expenditures already undertaken could provide that the
power should be construed to include expenditure.
300 [Vol. 41:295
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tions intact. The New Dealers knew there could be a problem
with that because they disapproved of many of the Court's in-
terpretations of the afirmative restrictions.0 The forward-look-
ing standpoint adopted here suggests a variation on this prob-
lem: What could the drafters do to entrench their decision to
grant Congress additional spending power against possible fu-
ture expansions of some affirmative limitation? What could they
do, for example, to forestall the possibility that some neo-
McReynolds in the 1960s would discover that-the Ninth Amend-
ment entitles the people to a national government that spends
no more than fifteen percent of gross domestic product?
The answer seems to be: not much, short of changing the
mechanism of constitutional enforcement, a kind of tinkering
also considered by Roosevelt and company. 1 Some qualification
of judicial review, such as vesting Congress with the power to
overrule the Supreme Court by an appropriate supermajority,
would advance this objective.32 In the 1930s, such amendments
were considered seriously and they presented some intriguing
design questions. 33 The leading option seems to have been to
give Congress the power to overrule the Court by a supermajority
vote, perhaps after an election by the House had intervened.34
The primary technical problem with such a regime is that it
gives Congress a blunter tool than the Court's. The simplest
context for a legislative override is one in which the Court has
decided that some identifiable provision is facially invalid. In
that case, congressional override is fairly straightforward; how-
ever, legal doctrine can be more subtle than that. To the extent
that constitutional liberties of action are protected by effects
tests, for example, legal rules are neither constitutional nor
unconstitutional on their face. The Court's decision that an act
30. See, e.g., Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 37, 43 (1937) (statement of Robert
H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the U.S.).
31. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 320-50.
32. The utilization of supermajority rules to change the scheme of constitutional
enforcement is a widely debated topic even today. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 365 (1999).
33. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 5, at 321-42.
34. See id. at 348-49.
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of Congress was impermissible under one set of facts does not
imply that it is impermissible under another. The question thus
arises whether, if Congress voted to override such a decision, the
new rule would be that the provision was permissible under all
circumstances, or just those at issue in the case. Consider also
the situation in which the Court decides that an act of Congress
is unconstitutional for one reason and therefore need not reach
other possible grounds of unconstitutionality: Would an override
vote affect only the ground the Court reached, or would it simply
insulate the provision at issue from all constitutional challeng-
es? It is difficult to imagine the latter result, if only because it
once again would permit enforcement through bills of attainder.
Another approach to entrenchment would be to consti-
tutionalize the restrictions on standing that insulated properly
designed spending programs from most judicial review in the
1930s. Under Frothingham v. Mellon,3 5 unconstitutional spend-
ing did not constitute the kind of private injury that gave rise to
a case or controversy.36 As Barry Cushman has explained, Butler
came before the courts as the result of almost willfully incompe-
tent drafting; had Congress been more circumspect or the Presi-
dent less insistent, the Agricultural Adjustment Act could have
been shielded by the taxpayer standing rule of Frothingham.
Constitutionalizing Frothingham presents its own drafting
problem. It probably would not do to provide that no court
should decide a case calling into question the validity of a feder-
al spending program, because one might wish to preserve the
courts' ability to review claims that conditions on spending were
unconstitutional, a form of review the Court seems to have con-
ducted in Butler itself.3" Rather, the objective would be to keep
the courts from holding that the very existence of the spending
program was impermissible.
An equally ineffective approach would be to say that the Con-
stitution does not create any right to be free from a federal ex-
penditure, because the validity question can arise in a defensive
35. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
36. See id. at 480.
37. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRuCTURE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 102 (1998).
38. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-78 (1936).
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posture, albeit a somewhat odd one. The federal government
could seek to avoid an obligation under a spending program by
arguing that the obligation never arose because the program
was invalid from the outset.39 Perhaps that eventuality is too
remote to be worth considering, in which case it probably would
suffice to state that the Constitution creates no individual enti-
tlement not to have money spent from the Treasury.4'
Neither a general limitation on judicial review nor an attempt
to write Frothingham into the Constitution would insulate the
new spending power from the conscience of legislators who
thought an exercise of it inconsistent with some a ative lim-
itation. That problem is of little practical importance, however.
Yes, a future legislator might think some spending program
desirable; nevertheless, he may find it inconsistent with an
unforeseen aspect of a currently existing constitutional limita-
tion. One cannot guard against every possibility, however.
The preceding problem concerned the interaction between
powers and limitations. Another problem results from interac-
tions among powers. In a system of enumeration, the presence of
one power can imply a limitation on another when, without the
limitation, the latter power would make the former unnecessary.
In the spending context, the argument would be that the pres-
ence of limited regulatory powers implies some limits on the use
of spending to influence behavior. That argument prevailed in
Butler when the Court noted that Congress could not do indi-
rectly through inducements what it could not do directly through
regulatory penalties.41 It is quite possible that Democrats in the
1930s would have been perfectly content with this result once
the regulatory powers had been expanded or given their proper
expansive construction. If the hypothetical New Deal drafters of
a spending power amendment wanted to make that result ex-
39. If this seems excessively strange, imagine a southern state seeking to repudi-
ate debt incurred in order to compensate slave owners for emancipation. In doing so,
the state would be able to rely on Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
40. Such a clause would have prevented the Court from reaching the conclusion
that it did in Flast v. Cohen. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (limiting judi-
cial power to a role consistent with the separation of powers doctrine). How the
Roosevelt Administration would have felt about that is an interesting question.
41. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 74.
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plicit, they could provide that spending could not be used to give
inducements to take action that Congress could not require. It
also would have been relatively easy to add that the spending
power could be used to provide inducements for private action,
notwithstanding whether such action could be required or forbid-
den by the exercise of another congressional power.
A spending power amendment may be unusual in that so
much attention must be given to constitutional context as op-
posed to the text of the amendment itself; however, the latter re-
quires some thought too. Of course, the particular language em-
ployed in an amendment depends on what the authors are try-
ing to accomplish, and here it depends on whether the New
Dealers would have wanted any restrictions built into the spend-
ing power. For purposes of discussion, I assume that the New
Dealers would have proposed what they regarded as a clarifying
amendment, which would have clearly established a power to
spend tax revenues for the common good of the country.
The first drafting step would thus be to make clear that the
spending power extended beyond the other enumerated powers.
It is quite possible that simply adding it to the list of enumer-
ated powers would do that because later interpreters would as-
sume that each power was there for a reason. If greater clarity
were sought, it would not be difficult to say that Congress, in
addition to the spending powers conferred elsewhere, should
have power to spend, subject to the appropriate modification.
The appropriate modification remains elusive. "Common de-
fense and general welfare" would not be a good idea because of
the danger that it might be given a Madisonian reading, under
which it is equivalent to "pursuant to the other enumerated
powers."42 If that option is put aside, some of the classic prob-
lems of constitutional interpretation arise, only as faced by the
drafter rather than the interpreter.
Requirements that legislation be general are designed to limit
the costs associated with interest group politics, through which
influential subparts of the citizenry enrich themselves at the
expense of taxpayers at large.' Implementing that principle,
42. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Powers, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 19-20 (1994).
43. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normatiue Ele-
ments of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L.
304 [Vol. 41:295
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however, is sufficiently tricky as to make one wonder whether
trying to do so is worthwhile. Most of the seemingly obvious
formulations of the general welfare principle encounter the phe-
nomenon that is so familiar from the other end of the interpre-
tive telescope: Their application depends so strongly on the iden-
tity of the person given interpretive authority that the formula-
tions amount largely to delegations of power to the interpreters.
Substantive provisions of that sort are structural provisions in
disguise. Whether a provision that directly invokes the substan-
tive policy involved is a good idea thus depends on one's views
about the allocation of authority between Congress and the
courts, assuming that some form of judicial enforcement is ex-
pected. If the amendment were combined with a guard against
judicial enforcement, or if it were anticipated that the rule of
Frothingham would continue in effect, then it is unlikely that an
explicit requirement that spending be for the general good would
make much difference. That is not because Congress would not
be moved in conscience. by such a provision, but because it is
quite unlikely that any government officer, whether Senator,
Representative, or judge, would think that a desirable program
was not in the national interest.
As the Constitution suggests, the next step is to search for
more concrete proxies for the ultimate goal. The main proxy for
generality in the Constitution as it stood in 1787 seems to have
been geography. For example, direct taxes had to be apportioned
among the states in a way that prevented redistribution;" non-
direct taxes had to be uniform throughout the United States;45
bankruptcy and naturalization laws had to be uniform;46 and
preferences among ports were impermissible.47
REv. 471, 504-07 (1988) (describing strategies "for controlling interest group activi-
ty").
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (stating that "n]o Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken ), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (allowing such a tax on
incomes); see also Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of 'Direct Taxes"." Are Con-
sumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2340 (1997) (describing the
apportionment requirement).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (stating that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States"); see also Jensen, supra note 44, at
2340.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress shall have power "[tlo
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
47. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (stating that "[n]o Preference shall be given by any
1999] 305
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It seems unlikely, though, that the New Dealers would have
sought similar requirements. Apportionment largely paralyzed
the power to levy direct taxes;48 a requirement of apportionment
or even uniformity in spending, even if a good idea, probably
would be administratively unworkable. Moreover, the Consti-
tution already contains a powerful inducement to spread spend-
ing evenly across the country: Congress is elected.
A supermajority requirement is useful when there is concern
that one interest group might exploit others. At times, various
groups that have felt threatened have sought such protection. In
the Federal Convention, the southern states initially demanded
a supermajority requirement for navigation acts, statutes that
could have given New England shippers a protected market in
transporting southern goods.49 Ultimately other features of the
system satisfied the staple exporters.50 Once again, however, it
seems unlikely that the Roosevelt Administration would have
wanted to impose further procedural obstacles to congressional
action and, in particular, to give potentially reactionary minori-
ties a new veto power.
Other methods of entrenchment do not purport to change the
constitutional text. The most obvious relies on the force of prece-
dent. One way to bind future constitutional interpreters to a
particular view is simply to act on it, thereby establishing prac-
tice. Such practice can consist of both judicial opinions and con-
gressional enactments. When Congress enacts legislation, it
influences the decisions of later interpreters who take seriously
what it has done.
Whether later interpreters will take either kind of precedent
seriously depends on their own norms regarding the relevance of
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of anoth-
er").
48. Probably the clearest demonstration of the inhibiting effect of the requirement
that direct taxes be apportioned among the states is the fact that Congress respond-
ed to Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (holding that
taxes on income from property are direct and must be apportioned), not by passing
an apportioned income tax, but by proposing the Sixteenth Amendment.
49. See Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution:
The Framers, the Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Princi-
ple, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 387 (1998) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 169, 183, 445-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
50. See id. at 412.
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earlier practice. Such norms vary. Different judges at different
times have found constitutional precedent to be of more or less
weight. For example, Chief Justice Taney once expressed a will-
ingness to reconsider constitutional questions.5 ' As for congres-
sional precedent, its importance also is a subject of debate. Ac-
cording to one canon, the actions of early Congresses are given
substantial weight because of their temporal proximity to the
framing of the Constitution, whereas the views of later Con-
gresses are no more likely to be correct than our own views.
In order to rely on precedent as a method of entrenchment,
one would have to entrench rules of precedent, other than
through an Article V amendment, or believe that one could fore-
cast confidently what those rules would be in the future. It is
difficult to understand how to do the former, or why one would
believe the latter.
Nevertheless, entrenchment without any formal amendment is
quite possible. In the 1930s, Congress and the Court did just
that by adopting a broad reading of the spending power.52 To
entrench an interpretation of a power means to ensure that in
the future, if the legislature decides to act on that interpreta-
tion, the judiciary will not stand in its way at the behest of los-
ers in the ordinary political arena. It means to take steps that
will make less likely the formation of a blocking minority that
can operate through the courts.53
On a larger scale, the Supreme Court's decisional tendencies
reflect the political views, including views as to proper jurispru-
dence and doctrine, of the President, the Senate, and of the legal
elites who staff the higher federal judiciary. The latter group is
the main source of the Court's countermajoritarian tendencies."
One way to prevent the formation of a blocking minority would
be to do something that would marshal widespread support for
51. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dis-
senting).
52. See supra text accompanying note 3.
53. Because the constitutional principle at issue involves a legislative power, a
blocking coalition that can operate through the legislative process is legitimate and
not to be guarded against.
54. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 543-51 (1997) (asking whether courts can "[ble Itirusted
to [1]imit [t]hemselves to [a]nti-[e]ntrenchment [rieview").
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the power at stake, so that the President and the Senate would
want to find Justices who have no trouble supporting the pro-
power interpretation.
Government programs are more likely to last when they cre-
ate their own constituency, especially if that constituency is the
vast bulk of the country. In particular, such a program is likely
to preserve the constitutional doctrine on which it rests, because
whatever remaining minority opposes it will have a very difficult
time getting the courts to agree. Public spending involves the
most notorious example of a program that created an immense
constituency. Social Security is the third rail of American poli-
tics: Touch it and you die. Another accurate image is to say that
it is protected from constitutional challenge by a very, very deep
trench. Broad and deep political support is the best guarantee of
persistence. That is the foundation upon which the Constitution
rests.
